SpaceGazelle wrote:

There is but one true question in philosophy as I understand it (which is practically nothing), and there is no direct test for it due to complicated evolutionary reasons, but that question is one of suicide.  Basically, is life worth living? All other questions in this area are stocking fillers, or something,

Elmlea wrote:

mistercrayon wrote:

You gotta push the fat man. He's a terrorist! Although what if the five on the track happened to be paedos, id be well embarrassed

Without a fairly specific legal framework though, you can't just decide to kill a terrorist!  You'd still be a murderer.

Vela wrote:

I see what you mean, but my understanding of the scenario is it is not specific enough. True, torture of the man gives no guarantees that his word is true. But it's the only way to possibly find it, and the guy is doomed either way. Since he is in the blast radius, he is inextricably linked to the event, and thus is fair game.

Should You Kill the Fat Man? - The Scenarios

Now it's time to see if you remain consistent in your moral outlook right through until the end of this activity.

The Fat Man and the Ticking Bomb (Scenario 4 of 4)

The fat man, having avoided being thrown in front of the runaway train, has been arrested, and is now in police custody. He states that he has hidden a nuclear device in a major urban centre, which has been primed to explode in 24 hours time. The following things are true:
[ol][li]The bomb will explode in 24 hours time.[/li][li]It will kill a million people if it explodes.[/li][li]If bomb disposal experts get to the bomb before it explodes, there’s a chance it could be defused.[/li][li]The fat man cannot be tricked into revealing the location of the bomb, nor is it possible to appeal to his better nature, nor is it possible to persuade him that he was wrong to plant the bomb in the first place.[/li][li]If the fat man is tortured, then it is estimated there is a 75% chance that he will give up the bomb’s location.[/li][li]If the fat man does not reveal the location, the bomb will explode, and a million people will die: there is no other way of finding out where the bomb is located.[/li][/ol]
Should the fat man be tortured in the hope that he will reveal the location of the nuclear device?
Yes, the fat man should be tortured
No, the fat man should not be tortured  

Some_Guy wrote:

 
1) Please indicate where it asserts that the fat man is in the blast radius. Whoops, I must have skimmed over part of it having read a similar example before this one.

2) Assuming the fat man is in the blast radius, here are the outcomes: 
a) No torture, bomb kills 1M people of which one happens to be the Fat man 
b) No torture, bomb kills 1M people of which one doesn't happen to be the Fat man 
c) Torture, bomb kills 1M people of which one happens to be the Fat man 
d) Torture, bomb kills 1M people of which one doesn't happen to be the Fat man 
e) Torture, bomb disabled, no one dies 
f) Torture, bomb disabled, fat man dies from torture. 

Explain to me how he is 'doomed either way' 

Facetious answer: he's going to prison, probably Guantanamo at the very least
Serious answers:
1. Multiply probabilities of success: 75% chance that torture leads to uncovering the bomb's location, and multiply that by the odds of a disposal tech being able to disarm it. I'd hazard a guess that it's a less than 50% chance, so we could be looking at, best case scenario, about a 1 in 3 chance that torture leads to him revealing the bomb location and then the bomb being disarmed. I concede you are technically right here, but not knowing the exact odds of disarming the bomb is the key to whether or not it's worth putting him on the rack.

However
2. No-one said anything about not evacuating a city or several. The pragmatic solution would be to spend 12 hours scanning for his recent movements and then evacuating a few of the most likely cities entirely. 

 
3) Assuming the fat man is in the blast radius of a bomb of his own responsibility, how does it make him 'fair game' as a candidate for torture with the intention of preventing the bomb's detonation.

Simply because he is probably dead in one case and at worst severely injured in both alternatives anyway. He might have nothing to lose and be less likely to tell the truth even under torture, but only by revealing the location does he have a chance of recovery. 

Torture and Counterterrorism Policy
The willingness of Western countries since September 11, 2001 to turn a blind eye to abuse in the name of counterterrorism cooperation poses a significant challenge to efforts to eradicate torture.  This is particularly true in the context of cooperation with security and intelligence services known for abuse. It is all too easy for information obtained by torture to be used by European authorities to guide operational decisions by the police and security services. In some cases it may also be introduced into the judicial process, either during the investigative phase or even at trial.  Far from shying away from such use, some European governments have openly questioned whether the ban should cover intelligence cooperation with governments that torture.

 
“Ticking bomb” scenario
Arguments in favor of executive use of foreign torture information frequently refer to variations on the so-called ticking bomb scenario.  In the usual version of this hypothetical scenario, an alleged perpetrator of an imminent terrorist attack is in custody and will reveal information critical to preventing the attack if tortured.       

 
Experts in the fields of intelligence-gathering, law enforcement and human psychology have forcefully discredited the use of this hypothetical situation to justify torture.  It rests on the impossible combination of perfect timing (the information will be obtained in time to defuse the bomb), perfect information (the person in custody definitely knows the location of the bomb and it could not have been moved and those conducting the torture are certain the person knows) and absolute certainty over the outcome (the person in custody will definitely provide the correct information once tortured and the bomb will subsequently be defused).[34]
 
Given the rarity of perfect timing, perfect information and absolute certainty in real life situations, reliance as a matter of policy on the ticking bomb hypothesis creates a significant risk that human beings will be brutalized on the basis of mere possibility or assumptions.  In the words of historian Alfred W. McCoy, “[o]nce we agree to torture the one terrorist with his hypothetical ticking bomb, then we admit the possibility, even an imperative, for torturing hundreds who might have ticking bombs or thousands who just might have some knowledge about those bombs.”[35]  McCoy’s conclusion, also based on studies of the use of torture by the CIA in Vietnam and by the French in Algeria: “Major success from limited, surgical torture is a fable, a fiction.  But mass torture of thousands of suspects, some guilty, most innocent, can produce some useful intelligence…Useful intelligence, but at what cost?”[36]
 
Several of the best known claims that torture produced information that has helped disrupt or prevent terrorist attacks have proven on closer examination to be false.  The torture of Abdul Hakim Murad in the Philippines in 1995, cited by advocates of the ticking bomb scenario, is one example.  Murad was subjected to torture at the hands of the Philippine police, but the vital information that led to preventing a plan to blow up trans-Pacific airliners was in fact obtained within minutes of his arrest – his laptop computer contained details of the plot.  A Philippine police officer later testified in court that most of the details Murad provided under torture were in fact fabrications fed to him by his torturers.[37]
 
Similarly, all of the useful information obtained from Abu Zubaida, the CIA’s first “high-level” captive, was obtained before he was subjected to waterboarding and other torture.  Information Abu Zubaida provided under torture did not, according to former senior US government officials, thwart any significant plots and in fact included false leads.[38]
 
The experience of Israel demonstrates the dangers of enacting policies based on the hypothetical ticking bomb.  In 1987 the Israeli government introduced guidelines permitting “moderate physical pressure” as well as psychological pressure during interrogations to supposedly prevent imminent terrorist attacks. The guidelines were based on the recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry, headed by former Supreme Court president Moshe Landau, which concluded that some degree of coercion was permissible in order to prevent terrorist acts, provided it was subject to supervision and clear limits.

 
Over the next twelve years, until the Supreme Court banned the policy in 1999, the General Security Services (commonly known as Shin Bet) institutionalized the use of coercive interrogation methods, including violent shaking, prolonged sleep deprivation, hooding with a sack whilst seated with hands behind the back in a low chair tilted forward (the “Shabach position”), the “frog” crouch, and exposure to loud noises and extreme temperatures.  What was intended as an exceptional measure became the norm, leading to widespread torture and ill-treatment of detainees far beyond the limits of what had been initially authorized. [39]
 
The Supreme Court ruled in 1999 that these physical means of interrogation were unlawful insofar as they were not part of a reasonable interrogation and violate human dignity.  Sleep deprivation, the Court said, was lawful if a “side effect” of the interrogation but would be unlawful if employed with the intention of tiring or “breaking” the detainee.[40] The Court rejected the Israeli government’s argument that the “necessity” defense—a provision in Israeli criminal law that absolves a person of liability if the crime was committed to prevent serious imminent harm—serves as a basis for advance authorization to use physical coercion.  It did, however, leave open the possibility that Shin Bet interrogators could avail themselves of the necessity defense if criminally indicted.[41]
 
A tragic case involving the kidnapping and murder of an 11-year-old boy in Germany in 2002 illustrates the willingness in Europe to accept, even advocate, police threats of torture and torture itself in seemingly exceptional circumstances.  Believing the boy to be alive, Frankfurt deputy police chief Wolfgang Daschner ordered a subordinate to threaten the kidnapper, who had been arrested after he collected the ransom, with severe pain if he did not reveal the child’s whereabouts.  After having been so threatened, Magnus Gäfgen confessed to kidnapping the boy and told police where to find him.

 
At Gäfgen’s trial, the Frankfurt Am Main Regional Court excluded the statements he made following the threat, and while they allowed evidence obtained as a result of those statements, based his 2003 conviction and life sentence on his admission of guilt at trial.  In December 2004, the same court convicted Daschner of incitement to commit coercion and the subordinate who carried out the threat of coercion, and sentenced them to suspended fines. Daschner was subsequently promoted.

 
At the same time, public figures in Germany sought to justify Daschner’s actions with very much the same arguments as those adopted by the Landau Commission. The chairman of the German Association of Judges, Geert Mackenroth said there were cases “in which the use of torture and the threatening of torture may be allowed, namely if one hurts a legally protected interest only to protect a higher valued legally protected interest.”[42]  His view was echoed by then Federal Justice Minister Brigitte Zypries.[43]  Jörg Schönbohm, then interior minister for Brandenburg, made the direct link to terrorism, arguing that “if a large number of people is threatened by terrorists, one would also have to consider torture.”[44]
 
The European Court of Human Rights, called upon to examine whether Germany had violated Gäfgen’s rights under articles 3 (torture prohibition) and 6 (right to a fair trial) of the European Convention on Human Rights, firmly rejected this logic.  In its June 2008 judgment, the Court underscored that “the prohibition on ill-treatment of a person in order to extract information from him applies irrespective of the reasons for which the authorities wish to extract a statement, be it to save a person’s life or to further criminal investigations.”[45] The Court found in that ruling that there had been no violation of the article 3 or article 6 of the Convention.  However, the Grand Chamber of the Court, in a June 1, 2010, judgment, found there had indeed been a violation of article 3 because the “almost token fines,” then suspended, imposed on Daschner and his subordinate constituted a “manifestly disproportionate” punishment without the “necessary deterrent effect in order to prevent further violations of the prohibition of ill-treatment in future difficult situations.”[46]  The Grand Chamber also considered that Daschner’s subsequent promotion “raised serious doubts as to whether the authorities’ reaction reflected, adequately, the seriousness involved in a breach of article 3.”[47]
 
The modified version of the ticking bomb scenario, which, as discussed below, has been cited by German and UK authorities to justify intelligence cooperation with countries that torture invents a situation in which authorities receive urgent information, obtained in a foreign country through torture, alleging a bomb in a public place that will explode shortly.  It differs from the classic ticking bomb in that the torture has already taken place, and at the hands of a foreign government.

 
Human Rights Watch agrees that in the hypothetical example the duty to prevent terrorist attacks would indeed impose an obligation on the police or security services to act upon such information, still recognizing the inherent unreliability of evidence obtained by torture. 

 
But there is no evidence that British, German or French authorities have faced such a situation.  Rather, the ticking bomb scenario serves as a distraction from what actually happens: the ongoing flow of information in the context of established relations with countries where torture is an organized practice. When they invoke the ticking bomb, European policymakers are sending a dangerous message that torture can help save lives and hence is morally defensible.

JonB wrote:

So, having discarded the norms of human interaction to set up the situation, and excluded in advance all other reasonable courses of action, does it really tell you anything if someone feels forced to be inconsistent in their moral norms in answering it?

Several of the best known claims that torture produced information that has helped disrupt or prevent terrorist attacks have proven on closer examination to be false.  The torture of Abdul Hakim Murad in the Philippines in 1995, cited by advocates of the ticking bomb scenario, is one example.  Murad was subjected to torture at the hands of the Philippine police, but the vital information that led to preventing a plan to blow up trans-Pacific airliners was in fact obtained within minutes of his arrest – his laptop computer contained details of the plot.  A Philippine police officer later testified in court that most of the details Murad provided under torture were in fact fabrications fed to him by his torturers.[37]
 
Similarly, all of the useful information obtained from Abu Zubaida, the CIA’s first “high-level” captive, was obtained before he was subjected to waterboarding and other torture.  Information Abu Zubaida provided under torture did not, according to former senior US government officials, thwart any significant plots and in fact included false leads.[38]

Facewon wrote:

I'm with you. As Jon says, as the scenario stands, and divorced from reality, it's tempting to say it. I don't think logic helps all that much here - I mean it never hurts - but I don't think it's a problem of logic that's the issue. And you're FWIW is borne out by the info that I quoted:

Several of the best known claims that torture produced information that has helped disrupt or prevent terrorist attacks have proven on closer examination to be false.  The torture of Abdul Hakim Murad in the Philippines in 1995, cited by advocates of the ticking bomb scenario, is one example.  Murad was subjected to torture at the hands of the Philippine police, but the vital information that led to preventing a plan to blow up trans-Pacific airliners was in fact obtained within minutes of his arrest – his laptop computer contained details of the plot.  A Philippine police officer later testified in court that most of the details Murad provided under torture were in fact fabrications fed to him by his torturers.[37]   Similarly, all of the useful information obtained from Abu Zubaida, the CIA’s first “high-level” captive, was obtained before he was subjected to waterboarding and other torture.  Information Abu Zubaida provided under torture did not, according to former senior US government officials, thwart any significant plots and in fact included false leads.[38]

Info was indeed found by means other than torture, and the info gained from torture was sketchy at best.

Question 2: The morality of an action is determined by whether, compared to the other available options, it maximises the sum total of happiness of all the people affected by it.

Question 4: If you can save the lives of innocent people without reducing the sum total of human happiness, and without putting your own life at risk, you are morally obliged to do so.

Vela wrote:

it maximises the sum total of happiness of all the people affected by it.

Another problem for utilitarianism is that it seems to overlook justice and rights. One common illustration is called Transplant. Imagine that each of five patients in a hospital will die without an organ transplant. The patient in Room 1 needs a heart, the patient in Room 2 needs a liver, the patient in Room 3 needs a kidney, and so on. The person in Room 6 is in the hospital for routine tests. Luckily (for them, not for him!), his tissue is compatible with the other five patients, and a specialist is available to transplant his organs into the other five. This operation would save their lives, while killing the “donor”. There is no other way to save any of the other five patients (Foot 1966, Thomson 1976; compare related cases in Carritt 1947 and McCloskey 1965).

We need to add that the organ recipients will emerge healthy, the source of the organs will remain secret, the doctor won't be caught or punished for cutting up the “donor”, and the doctor knows all of this to a high degree of probability (despite the fact that many others will help in the operation). Still, with the right details filled in, it looks as if cutting up the “donor” will maximize utility, since five lives have more utility than one life (assuming that the five lives do not contribute too much to overpopulation). If so, then classical utilitarianism implies that it would not be morally wrong for the doctor to perform the transplant and even that it would be morally wrong for the doctor not to perform the transplant. Most people find this result abominable. They take this example to show how bad it can be when utilitarians overlook individual rights, such as the unwilling donor's right to life.

Utilitarians can bite the bullet, again. They can deny that it is morally wrong to cut up the “donor” in these circumstances. Of course, doctors still should not cut up their patients in anything close to normal circumstances, but this example is so abnormal that we should not expect our normal moral rules to apply, and we should not trust our moral intuitions, which evolved to fit normal situations (Sprigge 1965). Many utilitarians are happy to reject common moral intuitions in this case, like many others (cf. Singer 1974, Unger 1996, Norcross 1997).

Most utilitarians lack such strong stomachs (or teeth), so they modify utilitarianism to bring it in line with common moral intuitions, including the intuition that doctors should not cut up innocent patients. One attempt claims that a killing is worse than a death. The doctor would have to kill the “donor” in order to prevent the deaths of the five patients, but nobody is killed if the five patients die. If one killing is worse than five deaths that do not involve killing, then the world that results from the doctor performing the transplant is worse than the world that results from the doctor not performing the transplant. With this new theory of value, consequentialists can agree with others that it is morally wrong for the doctor to cut up the “donor” in this example.

A modified example still seems problematic. Just suppose that the five patients need a kidney, a lung, a heart, and so forth because they were all victims of murder attempts. Then the world will contain the five killings of them if they die, but not if they do not die. Thus, even if killings are worse than deaths that are not killings, the world will still be better overall (because it will contain fewer killings as well as fewer deaths) if the doctor cuts up the “donor” to save the five other patients. But most people still think it would be morally wrong for the doctor to kill the one to prevent the five killings. The reason is that it is not the doctor who kills the five, and the doctor's duty seems to be to reduce the amount of killing that she herself does. In this view, the doctor is not required to promote life or decrease death or even decrease killing by other people. The doctor is, instead, required to honor the value of life by not causing loss of life (cf. Pettit 1997).